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Faculty and Deans

JUSTICE SCALIA AND ABORTION SPEECH
Timothy Zick*
INTRODUCTION

Justice Antonin Scalia was certainly no fan of Roe v. Wade
and the right to abortion.' He was, by contrast, a very strong
defender of the freedom of speech2 . This was true in a variety of
contexts. 3 However, for a number of reasons his opinions
concerning restrictions on anti-abortion speech at or near
abortion clinics stand out. In four cases involving such
communications, Justice Scalia railed against restrictions on
expressive activity.' True to form, he pulled no punches. Justice
Scalia accused his colleagues of distorting First Amendment
precedents and doctrines, using an "ad hoc nullification
machine" to limit or deny free speech protections,' and applying
an "abridged edition of the First Amendment" to anti-abortion
speech.' Not even the Court's decision in McCullen v. Coakley (the
last in the quartet), which invalidated a Massachusetts law
setting a thirty-five-foot buffer zone around all abortion clinics,
mollified Justice Scalia.' In his concurrence, the Justice argued
* Mills E. Godwin, Jr. Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor. I would like
to thank Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea for inviting me to participate in the
symposium. I would also like to thank the symposium participants for their comments
and engagement. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank the FirstAmendment
Law Review for organizing the symposium and publishing the contributions.
1 See Planned Parenthood of Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We should get out of this area, where we
have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any good by
remaining."); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 114 (1973), should be
overruled).
2 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1676 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The first axiom of the First Amendment is this: As a general rule, the state has no
power to ban speech on the basis of its content.").
3 See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 798 (2011) (invalidating a statute
that restricted the sale of violent video games by asserting that despite "astounding"
violence depicted in many video games, "disgust is not a valid basis for restricting
expression"); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392-93 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (advocating for the extension of free speech to corporations by saying,
"[t]he [First] Amendment is written in terms of 'speech,' not speakers").
See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).; Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Schenckv. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S.
357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
5 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785.
6 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring).
7
Id.
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that the Massachusetts law was plainly content-based and that
the majority's contrary conclusion was a product of its own bias
against anti-abortion speakers and speech.'
In the abortion clinic speech cases, Justice Scalia's
rhetoric and emotion sometimes threatened to obscure
significant insights and contributions with regard to freedom of
speech.' His opinions raised important and fundamental
concerns about access to the public forum, the importance of
hearing unwanted speech, the requirement of content neutrality,
the democratic values of political speech, and the evils of prior
restraints."o Justice Scalia's opinions also highlighted the
intersection between free speech rights and abortion rights." In
the clinic cases, he argued that the presence of the abortion right
established in Roe had skewed the Court's interpretation of free
speech rights.12

See id. at 2543-48 (arguing that the law was not content-neutral).
See id. at 2544 (criticizing the majority's failure to require a truly narrowly tailored
statute by characterizing their reasoning as "rather like invoking the eight missed
human targets of a shooter who has killed one victim to prove, not that he is guilty of
attempted mass murder, but that he has bad aim"); see also Daniel A. Farber, Playing
Favorites?Justice Scalia, Abortion Protests, and JudicialImpartiality, 101 MINN. L. REv.
HEADNOTES 23, 32 (2016) (arguing that Justice Scalia's reasoning in the clinic cases
suggested he was "emotionally overwrought").
10 See McCullen, at 2544-45 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Showing that a law that
suppresses speech on a specific subject is so far-reaching that it applies even when the
asserted non-speech-related problems are not present is persuasive evidence that the
law is content based. In its zeal to treat abortion-related speech as a special category,
the majority distorts not only the First Amendment but also the ordinary logic of
probative inferences."); see also id. at 2547 ("Moreover, a statute that forbids one side
but not the other to convey its message does not become viewpoint neutral simply
because the favored side chooses voluntarily to abstain from activity that the statute
permits."); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 803 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (" [A] ny characterization of a political protest movement as a violent conspiracy
'must be supported by findings that adequately disclose the evidentiary basis for
concluding that specific parties agreed to use unlawful means, that carefully identify
the impact of such unlawful conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding
the imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected activity."' (quoting Justice
Stevens in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 993-94 (1982)).
11 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Today's opinion carries
forward this Court's practice of giving abortion-rights advocates a pass when it comes
to suppressing the free-speech rights of their opponents.").
12 See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 795 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
upheld injunctive provisions that violated free speech principles because "the context
here is abortion"); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Having deprived abortion opponents of the political right to persuade the electorate
that abortion should be restricted by law, the Court today continues and expands its
assault upon their individual right to persuade women contemplating abortion that
what they are doing is wrong.").
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Thus, for defenders of robust public free speech rights,
there is much to commend in these opinions. However, looking
solely at the abortion clinic cases provides an incomplete and
misleading perspective on Justice Scalia's abortion speech
legacy. Justice Scalia was not always a fierce defender of
"abortion speech"-communications about or concerning the
recognition, scope, or exercise of abortion rights. He joined or
authored opinions upholding (1) restrictions on targeted
picketing of an abortion provider's residence,1 3 (2) state laws
mandating that physicians disclose certain information about
abortion procedures to their patients,14 and (3) federal spending
conditions that prohibited fund recipients from counseling their
patients about abortion." In these cases and contexts, Justice
Scalia voted to authorize restrictions on abortion speech. Justice
Scalia's opinions and votes in non-clinic cases also exhibited an
incomplete understanding of the abortion-free speech dynamic.
His clinic opinions treated the relationship between free speech
and abortion rights as one-directional, with abortion rights
negatively affecting free speech rights. However, the exercise of
free speech rights can impede or suppress the exercise of abortion
rights, and changes to understandings of abortion rights can
negatively impact free speech rights."6 By focusing narrowly on
only one possible direction or avenue of influence, Justice Scalia
elided the complex dynamic between free speech rights and
abortion rights.
My aim is not to assess whether Justice Scalia's opinions
or votes in these cases were "correct" in doctrinal terms.17
Rather, I will take stock of Justice Scalia's abortion speech legacy
in terms of his contributions to freedom of speech and our
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1988).
Planned Parenthood of Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 967-69 (Rehnquist,
C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing, in a portion of an opinion joined
by Justice Scalia, that informed consent provisions were valid).
15 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991) (upholding prohibition on abortion
speech at federally funded health care clinics).
16 See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758 ("The protests, the court found, took their toll on the
clinic's patients. A clinic doctor testified that, as a result of having to run such a
gauntlet to enter the clinic, the patients 'manifested a higher level of anxiety and
hypertension causing those patients to need a higher level of sedation to undergo the
surgical procedures, thereby increasing the risk associated with such procedures."').
17 Cf Farber, supra note 9 (declining to assess whether Justice Scalia's claims about
free speech and other doctrines were correct).
13

14

20171

S C,4L L4 & 4 B OR TION SPEE CH

291

understanding of the intersection between free speech and
abortion rights. By those lights, Justice Scalia's abortion speech
legacy is more complicated than the abortion clinic cases would
indicate.
Part I describes Justice Scalia's concurring and dissenting
opinions in the abortion clinic cases, as well as his votes in other
abortion speech cases. Part II situates abortion speech as part of
a constitutional discourse about rights, and discusses in general
terms the dynamic manner in which constitutional rights often
intersect with one another. Part III critically evaluates Justice
Scalia's abortion speech legacy as it relates to rights speech,
rights discourse, and rights dynamism.
I. JUSTICE SCALIA AND ABORTION SPEECH REGULATIONS

During his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia
reviewed a number of abortion speech regulations." Some of
those regulations involved restrictions on anti-abortion speech at
or near health care facilities that provided abortion services.19
However, the clinic cases were part of a more extensive abortion
speech jurisprudence.2 0 This Part describes Justice Scalia's
opinions and votes in all of the cases decided during his tenure
that involved abortion speech.
A. Abortion Speech At or Near Clinics
Protests at or near abortion clinics have long raised
concerns regarding women's access to abortion services and the
safety of those who visit abortion clinics.21 Courts and
legislatures have responded to these and other concerns by
imposing injunctive and statutory limits on expressive and other
activities at or near clinics.22 In terms of First Amendment free

1s The Court decided a few abortion speech precedents prior to Justice Scalia's
appointment. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (invalidating statute
making it a crime to publish material encouraging procurement of abortion).
19 See infra Part I.A. (discussing abortion clinic free speech cases).
20 See infra Part I.B. (describing non-clinic abortion
speech cases).
21 See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758-59 (describing the effects that protests
had both on the
women obtaining abortions and the staff working at the clinics).
22

See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT

LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 118-21 (2014) (discussing abortion clinic protests).
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speech rights, two classes of speakers-anti-abortion protesters
and sidewalk counselors (individuals on site who seek through
one-on-one counseling to persuade women not to have an
abortion)-have been burdened by these restrictions.23
In four cases decided during Justice Scalia's tenure, the
Supreme Court reviewed judicial injunctions or state laws
imposing limits on abortion speech at or near clinics.24 Justice
Scalia wrote concurring and/or dissenting opinions in all four
cases.
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,25 the Court
reviewed a broad injunction that set up a thirty-six-foot buffer
zone around the clinic, prohibited loud noises and sound
amplification during surgical hours, and prohibited the
defendants from physically approaching anyone seeking to use
the clinic without that person's consent.26 In an opinion authored
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court invalidated the bubble
provision that banned all unwanted physical approaches, but
upheld the thirty-six-foot buffer zone and other injunctive
provisions.2 7
Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment and partial
dissent accused the majority of departing from settled First
Amendment standards concerning judicial review of
injunctions.2 8 He contended that the majority applied a novel and
weak form of scrutiny ("intermediate" scrutiny) to an injunction
that was specifically sought by "persons and organizations with
a business or social interest in suppressing" the view of "a singleissue advocacy group." 2 9 In Justice Scalia's view, the injunction

See id. at 136-39.
See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2537 (2014) (invalidating Massachusetts
law); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724-25 (2000) (finding a Colorado state law
content neutral); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376
(1997) (concluding that the underlying governmental interest justified the injunction
to secure unimpeded physical access to clinics); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768 (1994)
(agreeing with the Supreme Court of Florida that governmental interests justified an
appropriately tailored injunction to protect the well-being of patients).
25 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
26
Id. at 757-79.
27
Id. at 757.
28 Id. at 785. For an argument that Justice Scalia overstated the clarity
of the law on
this point, see Farber, supra note 9, at 30-31.
29 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 793 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
23

24
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directly targeted anti-abortion speech, and thus should have been
subjected to the strictest form of First Amendment scrutiny."
In a rhetorical pattern that would continue throughout
the abortion clinic cases, he attributed this departure to the fact
that "the context here is abortion."" In the abortion context, he
contended, the Court was prone to bending or breaking doctrinal
rules. Justice Scalia wrote that "[t]oday the ad hoc nullification
machine claims its latest, greatest, and most surprising victim:
the First Amendment." 32
Justice Scalia's opinion in Madsen contains a lengthy
description of a videotape depicting the events that led to the
injunction. As he described it, the video shows that both
opponents and supporters of Roe v. Wade gathered near the clinic
to participate in peaceful and non-disruptive protests,
demonstrations, and other forms of expression.34 Justice Scalia
emphasized that all of this activity occurred on a public sidewalk
area, where speakers had a First Amendment right to gather and
communicate.
Justice Scalia warned that the Court's exceptional
abortion speech jurisprudence constituted a "powerful loaded
weapon lying about" for others to invoke in efforts to stifle
viewpoints with which they disagreed. 36 He concluded his
opinion: "What we have decided seems to be, and will be
reported by the media as, an abortion case. But it will go down
in the lawbooks, it will be cited, as a free-speech injunction
case-and the damage its novel principles produce will be
considerable." 37
The Court reviewed a second abortion speech injunction
in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network.3 ' The injunction in Schenck
required individuals at all times to stay fifteen feet away from

See id. at 792-93 (discussing why strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard).
Id. at 785.
32 Id.
33
Id. at 786-90.
34 See id. at 790 ("What the videotape, the rest of the record, and the trial court's
findings do not contain is any suggestion of violence near the clinic, nor do they
establish any attempt to prevent entry or exit.").
35
Id. at 786-90.
36
1Id. at 815.
37 Id.
38 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
30
31
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those entering or leaving the clinic (a floating buffer zone) and
imposed a fifteen-foot buffer zone around the entrances of the
clinic (a fixed buffer zone).39 The Court, again in an opinion
delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, invalidated the floating
buffer zone but upheld the fixed buffer zone.4 0 Justice Scalia,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, repeated his charge
from Madsen that the Court had not applied the correct standard
of review for injunctions that burden speech.41
Justice Scalia also lectured his colleagues extensively on
the evil of injunctions and their use as a suppressive weapon. His
specific contention was that the injunctive buffer zone could not
be upheld on the basis of public safety or access interests, which
he argued could only be raised by the state executive.4 2 Instead,
he argued that the only basis for upholding the injunctive buffer
zone was the invalid one of protecting a non-existent "right to be
free of unwelcome speech on the public streets while seeking
entrance to or exit from abortion clinics."4 3 Justice Scalia rejected
that interest as contrary to fundamental free speech principles
and precedents.4 4 He argued that courts had a "responsibility of
special care" that required them to accommodate speech rights
in public places.4 5 He chastised his colleagues for treating this
duty as a form of "judicial gratuity," and for taking it upon
themselves to posit public safety justifications for an injunction
that he viewed as plainly supported by other interests-including
the invalid one of protecting public audiences from unwelcome
speech.4 6
The Court also reviewed two statutory restriction on
abortion speech near clinics. In the first case, Hill v. Colorado,47
the Court upheld a Colorado law that forbade any person within
100 feet of an abortion clinic to "knowingly approach" within
eight feet of another person, without that person's consent, "for
the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign
39
40

id. at 367.

See id. at 380-81.
See id. at 385 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42
1 d at 392-93.
43
1 d. at 386.
44 See id. at 390 (explaining the Court's obligation to protect free speech).
45
d. at 391.
46
1 d. at 391-94.
47 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
41
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to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with
such other person . . . ."48 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens concluded that the statute was content-neutral, that the
state had a significant interest in protecting individuals using the
clinic from unwanted speech, and that the restriction was
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.4 9
Justice Scalia argued that the law was obviously contentbased-indeed, he contended that it was aimed directly at the
speech of sidewalk counselors and others who sought to
persuade women not to exercise the right to abortion."o He had
"no doubt that this regulation would be deemed content based in
an instant if the case before us involved antiwar protesters, or
union members seeking to 'educate' the public about the reasons
for their strike."" As a content-based restriction on speech in a
traditional public forum, Justice Scalia argued that the law was
subject to strict scrutiny and could not be justified under that

standard.52
As he had in Schenck, Justice Scalia took particular issue
with the Court's recognition of a privacy-based interest in
avoiding unwanted speech in public fora. " Noting that the Court
had recognized an interest in avoiding unwanted speech only in
the context of a person's residence, he asserted that the Court
"today elevates the abortion clinic to the status of the home."54
He argued that the Court's recognition of a "right to be let alone"
in public places would imperil labor picketing and other means
of speech that audiences might deem unwelcome or offensive.55
As Justice Scalia noted, the majority reasoned that "the statute
aims to protect distraught women who are embarrassed, vexed,
or harassed as they attempt to enter abortion clinics."5' "Ifthese

§ 18-9-122(3) (1999).
Hill, 530 U.S. at 705, 718, 726-31.
50 M. at 742-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Colorado
law was contentbased).
48

COLO. REV. STAT.

49

51

d. at 742.

See id. at 748-49, 755-56 (explaining why strict scrutiny analysis is applicable to this
regulation).
5 Id. at 750-54.
54
d. at 753.
5 Id. at 751, 753.
5
d. at 777.
52
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are punishable acts," he argued, "they should be prohibited in

those terms."5
Justice Scalia accused the majority of "willful ignorance"
regarding the "type and nature of communication affected by the
statute's restrictions."" He characterized as "absurd" the notion
that sidewalk counselors would still be able under the terms of
the law to communicate with women seeking to access abortion
clinics.5 9 Justice Scalia charged that "the Court must know that
most of the 'counseling' and 'educating' likely to take place
outside a health care facility cannot be done at a distance and at
a high-decibel level."60 He depicted the sidewalk counselor as a
peaceful persuader-a "woman who hopes to forge, in the last
moments before another of her sex is to have an abortion, a bond
of concern and intimacy that might enable her to persuade the
woman to change her mind and heart.""1 Justice Scalia also
criticized the Court for not protecting First Amendment rights to
engage in handbilling and leafleting-things he said the Court
knew or should have known could not be realistically
accomplished if each woman had to provide affirmative consent
to the speaker's approach.6 2
Finally, in Hill, Justice Scalia criticized the Court for not
being adequately sensitive to the importance of the special place
affected by the Colorado speech restriction.6 3 He wrote: "The
public forum involved here-the public spaces outside health
care facilities-has become, by necessity and by virtue of this
Court's decisions, a forum of last resort for those who oppose
abortion." 64 Justice Scalia argued:
[Since t]he possibility of limiting abortion by
legislative means-even abortion of a live-andkicking child that is almost entirely out of the
womb-has been rendered impossible by our
SId. (emphasis added).
d. at 756.
5

Id.

Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
Id.
62 Id. at 757-58.
63 Id. at 763 ("A proper regard for the 'place' involved in this case
should result in, if
anything, a commitment by this Court to adhere to and rigorously enforce our speechprotective standards.").
64
Id. at 763.
60
61
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"

decisions . . . [flor those who share an abiding
moral or religious conviction (or, for that matter,
simply a biological appreciation) that abortion is
the taking of a human life, there is no option but
to persuade women, one by one, not to make that
choice.
"[A]s a general matter," he wrote, "the most effective place, if
not the only place, where that persuasion can occur is outside the
entrances to abortion facilities.""6 Justice Scalia concluded by
comparing the Court's decision in Hill to its invalidation of a
state partial birth abortion ban handed down that same day:
"Does the deck seem stacked? You bet."6 7
Returning to themes of bias and distortion from his
opinions in Madsen and Schenck, Justice Scalia described Hill as
yet another precedent in the Court's "relentlessly proabortion
jurisprudence"" and repeated his charge that "the jurisprudence
of this Court has a way of changing when abortion is involved. "69
Palpably losing patience with what he saw as a pattern of
discriminatory treatment of anti-abortion speech and speakers
and a distorting bias in favor of abortion rights, Justice Scalia
ended his dissent in Hill with this:
What is before us . . . is a speech regulation
directed against the opponents of abortion, and it
therefore enjoys the benefit of the "ad hoc
nullification machine" that the Court has set in
motion to push aside whatever doctrines of
constitutional law stand in the way of that highly
favored practice. Having deprived abortion
opponents of the political right to persuade the
electorate that abortion should be restricted by
law, the Court today continues and expands its
assault upon their individual right to persuade
women contemplating abortion that what they are
doing is wrong.7 0
65
66
61

6
6

1

70

Id.
Id.
Id. at 764.
d. at 750.
d. at 742.
Id. at 741-42 (citation omitted).
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Most recently, in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court
invalidated a Massachusetts law that established a thirty-fivefoot buffer zone around all facilities in the state where abortions
were performed.7 1 Although the Court struck down the buffer
zone law, which it treated as content-neutral, Justice Scalia
characterized the majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts as
one that "carries forward this Court's practice of giving abortionrights advocates a pass when it comes to suppressing the freespeech rights of their opponents."7 2 "There is," he wrote, "an
entirely separate, abridged edition of the First Amendment
applicable to speech against abortion."7 3
Justice Scalia's primary criticism of the majority opinion
was that it did not treat the Massachusetts law, which applied
only at abortion clinics and did not restrict all speech in the
designated zone, as content-based and subject to strict scrutiny.7 4
He argued that it "blinks reality to say, as the majority does, that
a blanket prohibition on the use of streets and sidewalks where
speech on only one politically controversial topic is likely to
occur-and where that speech can most effectively be
communicated-is not content-based." 7 5
As Justice Scalia had in previous cases, he accused the
majority of fashioning novel rules for analyzing restrictions on
anti-abortion speech, as well as for offering dicta and advice that
was designed to ease First Amendment limits on anti-abortion
speech regulation. 76 He concluded: "The obvious purpose of the
Massachusetts Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act is to
'protect' prospective clients of abortion clinics from having to
hear abortion-opposing speech on public streets and
sidewalks. 77
B. Abortion Speech in Other Contexts

71
72

73
74

75

McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
d.
1d.

d. at 2543.
See id. at 2542-43 (charging that the Court's dictum would encourage jurisdictions
to enact and enforce abortion speech restrictions).
Id. at 2548-49.
71
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The Supreme Court's abortion speech jurisprudence
extends beyond the four clinic cases. During Justice Scalia's
tenure, the Court also reviewed abortion speech restrictions in
three other contexts: restrictions on residential picketing,
mandatory disclosures by physicians counseling patients seeking
an abortion, and funding conditions restricting abortion
communications. Justice Scalia did not write separately in these
cases. However, his voting record and the opinions he joined
indicate his views with regard to abortion speech in these
contexts.
In Frisby v. Schultz,78 which was the first abortion speech
precedent decided during Justice Scalia's tenure, the Supreme
Court upheld a local ordinance prohibiting speakers from
engaging in what it referred to as "focused picketing"essentially, maintaining a continuous presence outside a person's
residence.7 9 On several occasions, the speakers in Frisby had
gathered on the sidewalks outside an abortion provider's
suburban residence in order to quietly and peacefully protest his
provision of abortion services." Under the terms of the
ordinance, as the Court interpreted it, speakers were permitted
to march along the streets and sidewalks of the residential
neighborhood but were barred from focusing their protest on a
single residence."
Despite the fact that it operated to restrict anti-abortion
speech, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion upholding the
ordinance.8 2 Since he did not write separately, we do not have a
record of Justice Scalia's rationale. However, in Hill, Justice
Scalia cited Frisbyfor the principle that individuals enjoy a strong
right to privacy in the home that does not extend to the public
sidewalks and streets." Also in Hill, Justice Scalia distinguished
Frisby on the ground that the picketing ordinance was contentneutral on its face-i.e., it prohibited anyone, regardless of

"487 U.S. 474 (1988).
See id. at 488.
'od. at 476.
sid. at 483.
82
d at 475.
83 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 752 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7
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subject matter or viewpoint, from engaging in the practice of
targeted picketing.84
The Court has also addressed, although only cryptically,
First Amendment concerns raised by state laws mandating that
physicians convey certain factual and other information to
women seeking abortions. Before discussing the free speech
issue, some background regarding mandatory physician
disclosures is useful.
Mandatory abortion disclosure laws have been a
mainstay of post-Roe abortion regulation. States have typically
defended these laws on the ground that they ensure that women
are giving their informed consent to the abortion procedure. By
contrast, abortion rights proponents have attacked mandatory
disclosure laws as thinly disguised efforts to interfere with a
woman's right to choose.
Between Roe v. Wade and PlannedParenthoodv. Casey85
which retained Roe's basic premise that there is a right to
abortion, but abandoned the trimester approach and recalibrated the state's interests in the abortion decision"6 -the
Court invalidated some mandatory state disclosure laws. For
example, in a 1983 case, the Court voided a provision mandating
that physicians communicate a detailed set of guidelines
regarding the development of the fetus, the date of possible
viability, and the complications that might result from an
abortion.87 Although free speech arguments were raised in these
cases, the Court invalidated the mandatory disclosures on the
ground that they violated the Due Process Clause by interfering
with exercise of the right to abortion." The Court concluded that
the mandated disclosures were "designed not to inform the
woman's consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it

altogether.

"89

After Roe, the Court held that state and federal
governments were not required to fund or otherwise financially
84

d.

8 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
86

Id.

8 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416, 44445 (1983) (invalidating information and informed consent provisions).
8 See, e.g., id. at 451-52.
89
Id. at 444.
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support access to abortion services.9 0 It also clarified that
governments were entitled to make a "value judgment" that
childbirth was preferable to abortion-through allocation of
public funds and by other means.91 These decisions set the stage
for PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, in which the Court established a
new framework for structuring physician-patient conversations
about abortion.92 Under this framework, governments are
permitted to seek to persuade women not to exercise their
constitutional right to choose to terminate a pregnancy, so long
as they do not coerce women or otherwise unduly interfere with
the abortion decision.93
Applying this framework in Casey, the Court upheld a
Pennsylvania requirement that compelled physicians, within
twenty-four hours of performing an abortion, to inform the
woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the
abortion and of childbirth, and the "probable gestational age of
the unborn child." 94 It also upheld a requirement that the
physician or a qualified non-physician inform the woman that
printed materials were available from the state that described the
fetus and provided information about medical assistance for
childbirth, information about child support from the father, and
a list of agencies offering adoption and other services as
alternatives to abortion.9 5
In Casey, the Court overruled prior precedents
invalidating almost identical compulsory disclosures under the
Due Process Clause. The joint opinion reasoned that the State
was entitled "to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of
the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision
that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State
expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion."9 6 The joint
opinion rejected the physicians' claim that the mandatory
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-18 (1980) (rejecting challenges to the Hyde
Amendment, which barred payments even for most medically necessary abortions);
see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (upholding denial of Medicaid funds
for abortion services).
91 Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
92 Planned Parenthood of Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
877-78 (1992).
9o

9
94

Id.
1d. at 881.

95

Id.

96

Id. at 8 8 3.
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disclosures compelled speech in violation of the First
Amendment.9 7 With regard to the free speech issue, the joint
opinion contained only this ambiguous paragraph:
All that is left of petitioners' argument is an
asserted First Amendment right of a physician not
to provide information about the risks of abortion,
and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State.
To be sure, the physician's First Amendment
rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v.
Maynard ..
, but only as part of the practice of
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State, cf Whalen v. Roe . .. We
see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement
that the physician provide the information
mandated by the State here.9 8
This was the only reference to the First Amendment in
any of the Casey opinions. Although the authors of the Casey joint
opinion appeared to conclude that the First Amendment applied
to the mandated physician communications, they seemed to
reason that Pennsylvania could compel abortion disclosures
pursuant to its authority to license the practice of medicine.99 The
Court did not indicate what First Amendment standard of review
applied in the context of mandatory abortion disclosures.
In his dissenting opinion in Casey, Justice Scalia
concluded that all of the Pennsylvania regulations, including the
mandatory disclosure provisions, would satisfy rational basis
review-the standard he would have applied after overruling Roe
v. Wade.100 Justice Scalia also joined a partial dissent authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in which the Chief Justice reasoned that
the Court's precedents invalidating mandatory disclosures had
been wrongly decided and were thus not controlling."o' The
Chief Justice's opinion did not mention the physicians' free
speech claim. Thus, neither in his own opinion, nor the opinion
he joined, is there any discussion of Justice Scalia's views
" Id. at 884.
98 Id.
9 See id. (rejecting compelled speech claim).
100 See id at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101 See id at 966 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
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regarding the First Amendment as it pertains to compulsory
physician communications. His unambiguous views that states
have broad power to regulate abortion and can convey their own
points of view regarding abortion suggest that Justice Scalia did
not see merit in the First Amendment claim.
Notably, with regard to free speech, Justice Scalia also
expressed irritation at what he viewed as the illegitimate
proposition that the Court should take public opinion into
account when considering abortion rights. He was particularly
perturbed that the public would address their arguments about
abortion to the justices. In his Casey opinion, Justice Scalia
expressed distress "about the 'political pressure' directed to the
Court: the marches, the mail, the protests aimed at inducing us
to change our opinions."102 He did not take the position that
these expressive activities ought to be suppressed; his point was

that they were misdirected.103
In addition to conveying their views about abortion
through private physicians, states can also influence private
speech about abortion through the power of the purse. Again,
there is no requirement that taxpayer funds be provided for even
medically necessary abortions.10 4 Nor is the government required
to financially support pro-choice or pro-life advocacy. It is
generally free to communicate its own views with regard to
abortion.
In Rust v. Sullivan,"o' the Court held that the federal
government could prohibit physicians working at federallyfunded family planning projects from engaging in abortion
counseling or advocacy while using program funds."o6 Federal
regulations required that if asked about abortion services,
physicians at federally funded projects should respond that the
facility did not consider abortion an appropriate method of
family planning.10 7 Funding recipients and their patients argued
Id. at 999 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
See id. at 999-1000.
104 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (holding that federal law denying
subsidy for medically necessary abortions did not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause).
102
103

105

106

500 U.S. 173 (1991).

See id. at 196.
Id. at 180 ("[I]n implementing the statutory prohibition by forbidding counseling,
referral, and the provision of information regarding abortion as a method of family
107
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that the federal funding restrictions amounted to forbidden
viewpoint discrimination."' However, the Court reasoned that
when it distributes taxpayer funds, the government is allowed to
limit activities-including expressive activities-to the scope of
the funded project.109 Thus, the Court held, in a project that is
designed to fund pregnancy and other prenatal health care
services, the government is allowed to prohibit the expenditure
of funds for abortion services and to ban abortion speech that
might lead to the provision of such services.110
Governments may also expend funds to communicate
directly with the public about abortion. Although the Rust
decision itself did not explicitly mention the government's role
as speaker, subsequent Supreme Court precedents have
interpreted Rust to stand for the proposition that when the
government speaks, it is not required to maintain viewpoint
neutrality with regard to abortion."' Thus, for example,
governments may run public service announcements to convey
pro- or anti-abortion speech messages and may finance public
programs to facilitate the communication of their preferred
abortion messages. The Court has indicated that when the
government speaks about abortion or other matters, it is excused
from complying with the First Amendment's content-neutrality
requirement as it pertains to private speech.112
Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in Rust in full.
If he had any reservations about conditional funding and its
effect on abortion speech, he did not express them. Nor, in
subsequent cases, did he feel that it was necessary to characterize
planning, the regulations simply ensure that appropriate funds are not used for
activities, including speech, that are outside the federal program's scope.").
10. Id. at 192.
109
See id. at 200.
110 Lower courts have upheld a similar set of restrictions with regard to the funding of
internationalfamily planning projects. See DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l
Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding government's refusal to fund
abortion speech by international organizations); see also Nina J. Crimm, The Global Gag
Rule: UnderminingNationalInterests by Doingunto Foreign Women andNGOs What Cannot
Be Done at Home, 40 CORNELLINT'L L.J. 587, 601 n.98 (2007).
...See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(recognizing that "when the government appropriates public funds to promote a
particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes") (citing Rust, 500 U.S.
at 194).
112 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (holding that
government speech is not limited by the Free Speech Clause).
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or recast Rust as a "government speech" precedent in order to
uphold limits on government funding programs.1 13 As Justice
Scalia explained in a subsequent case, Rust recognized that when
the government provides funding it may decline to subsidize
activities or communications that are beyond the scope of the
funding program.1 1 ' In short, Justice Scalia took a broad view of
the government's funding authority vis-A-vis the free speech
rights of funding recipients. His view, as suggested by his vote in
Rust and his opinions in other cases, was that speakers were free
to refuse public funds and communicate as, and what, they
wished."'
In stark contrast to his approach and tone in the abortion
clinic cases, in other contexts Justice Scalia was not disturbed by
restrictions on abortion speech. In the context of residential
protests, he voted to uphold restrictions on targeted anti-abortion
speech."' He also approved government mandates that private
physicians convey factual and other abortion-related information
to patients.11 7 Finally, Justice Scalia took a broad view of the
government's power to ban abortion speech as a condition of
public funding programs. 1
II.

RIGHTS SPEECH, RIGHTS DISCOURSE, AND RIGHTS
DYNAMISM

As I have indicated, my goal is not to assess whether
Justice Scalia's opinions and votes in the abortion clinic and
other cases were doctrinally correct. Rather, I wish to assess his
abortion speech legacy from a broader perspective, at a level or
two removed from the details of individual cases. In order to do
so, I want first to situate abortion speech as a form of "rights
speech" and as part of a discourse about or concerning
113

See Legal Servs. Corp v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 554 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

114 See id.

See, e.g., id. at 558-59 ("The LSC subsidy neither prevents anyone from speaking
nor coerces anyone to change speech, and is indistinguishable in all relevant respects
from the subsidy upheld in Rust v. Sullivan.").
11' See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 491 (1988) (upholding targeted picketing
ordinance).
117 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882, 889 (1992)
(upholding mandatory abortion disclosure provision).
"I See Legal Servs. Corp, 531 U.S. at 553-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115

306

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

constitutional rights. I also want to provide some context
regarding the dynamic intersection of constitutional rights and
the effects of that intersection on constitutional interpretation.
A. Rights Speech and Rights Discourse
As I have written elsewhere, communications about or
concerning the recognition, scope, or enforcement of
constitutional rights can collectively be referred to as "rights
speech." 1 19 In terms of First Amendment values, rights speech
occupies a special position. It is a form of political speech that is
central to self-governance, the search for truth, and individual
autonomy.120 The liberty to discuss and debate formal limits on
government-constitutional rights - is central to American
democracy, to understandings of liberty, and to individual selffulfillment.
First Amendment rights to communicate about, and
receive information regarding, constitutional rights facilitate not
only freedom of speech, but also the exercise of non-speech
constitutional rights. Speakers who are free to protest the denial
of rights, to publish information about rights, and to receive
information concerning rights, are more effectively able to
exercise those rights.
Rights speech is prevalent in American political and
cultural discourse. Abortion speech is a type, or form of, rights
speech. The abortion clinic cases discussed in Part I all involved
restrictions on communications about, or concerning, abortion.
Public protest and sidewalk counseling are traditional, and easily
recognizable, forms of rights speech. However, rights speech
takes many forms and occurs in a variety of different contexts.12 1
It is conveyed in print and online publications, in everyday
conversations, on billboards, through symbolic acts, by means of
associations and assemblies, through lobbying, and by the filing
of lawsuits.
Rights speech also occurs in other less visible and nontraditional contexts. During consultations with clients and
"' See generallyTimothy
120
Id at 4.

121 See id.

Zick, Rights Speech, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (2014).
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patients, licensed professionals sometimes communicate about,
or concerning, constitutional rightsl2 2 Lawyers communicate
advice to clients concerning potential constitutional claims.
Physicians consult with patients about a range of matters that
relate to or concern the exercise of constitutional rights - i.e.,
contraception, abortion, arms possession, adoption and other
family concerns, and end of life matters.
In these contexts, the discussion may or may not focus on
rights as legal constructs. Professionals and clients do not tend to
use the formal language of rights. Lawyers and physicians do not
generally engage in seminar-like discourses with their clients
about abortion or other constitutional rights. Indeed, during
most consultations they may not mention constitutional
provisions, or precedents, at all. However, professional-client
communications may nonetheless concern or touch upon the
status, enforcement, or exercise of a constitutional right. A
physician's examination of a broken ankle is not the same as a
consultation concerning the health effects or availability of
contraception or abortion services. Only the latter consultation
touches upon or concerns a constitutional right. For that reason,
we may rightly view laws that restrict or compel physicianpatient communications in that context as raising not just
medical but also constitutional concerns.
Some examples will help to identify rights speech and
take measure of both its frequency and regulation. Consider the
following laws and regulations:
* State laws banning physicians from asking patients about
firearms possession;1 23
* State bar rules that treat certain communications
opposing transgender equality as a form of prohibited
harassment;12 4
See generally Timothy Zick, ProfessionalRightsSpeech, 47 ARIz. ST. L. J. 1290 (2016).
See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger I), 814 F.3d 1159, 1201-02
(11th Cir. 2015) (upholding Florida's Firearms' Owners Privacy Act).
122
123

124

See

Revised

Resolution

Rule

8.4:

Misconduct,

AM.

BAR

Ass'N,

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional respo
nsibility/final revised resolution and report 109.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited
October 15, 2016) (proposing extended protection for transgendered individuals and
including gender identity under protected groups).
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* Laws that prohibit local authorities from using state funds
for the purpose of lobbying the state legislature to impose
gun controls;1 25
* State-mandated scripts requiring physicians to inform
patients that abortion has certain negative health effects
on the mother or will terminate a human life;126
* Laws that authorize public funding of health care services
on the condition that recipients not advocate or discuss
abortion;1 27
* Local ordinances requiring that crisis pregnancy centers
discuss the availability of abortion as a viable alternative
to childbirth;12 8 and
* State programs authorizing the issuance of specialty prolife, but not pro-choice, license plates.129
In these examples, governments directly regulate, or seek
to influence, communications about, or concerning, the Second
Amendment,
abortion,
equal protection,
and other
constitutional rights. In other contexts, governments may apply
ostensibly content-neutral regulations in a manner that
disparately impacts or influences communications about or
concerning constitutional rights. For example, imagine a
municipal signage ordinance that, as applied, bans the display of
125 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6705 (West 2014) (prohibiting local officials from using
state funds to lobby for or against gun control at the state level).
126 See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing
Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
577 (5th Cir. 2012) (rejecting compelled speech claim brought by physicians); Planned
Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. State Dep't of Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d 892,
916, 918 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (upholding requirement that physicians inform abortion
patients that "human physical life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human
sperm").
127 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
196 (1991).
128 See Evergreen Ass'n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233,
249-50 (2d Cir. 2014)
(invalidating pregnancy center services disclosure provision under strict and
intermediate scrutiny); Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of
Balt. (GreaterBalt. Ctr. 1), 683 F.3d 539, 555 (4th Cir. 2012) (invalidating mandatory
pregnancy center disclosures under strict scrutiny). But see Fargo Women's Health
Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 182 (N.D. 1986) (upholding mandatory
disclosures).
129 Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that
Illinois prohibition of pro-choice license plates but not pro-life ones-the former of
which connotes a stance on abortion-was reasonable because "[t]o the extent that
messages on specialty license plates are regarded as approved by the State, it is
reasonable for the State to maintain a position of neutrality on the subject of
abortion").
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a billboard communicating opposition to the government's use
of eminent domain.13 0 Or consider municipal rules that impose
restrictions on "political" speech in public transit and other
venues, a practice that may significantly impact the ability of
speakers to communicate about constitutional rights.
Of course, the mere fact that such regulations touch upon,
or concern, a constitutional right does not necessarily mean that
they violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional
provision. However, each law, rule, or regulation implicates the
communication of information about or concerning a
constitutional right. In the above examples, governments seek to
bar, restrict, or influence communications about, or concerning,
a constitutional right.
Rights speech regulations can affect particular
conversations regarding individual rights, some of them private.
However, they also regulate speech that is part of a public
discourse about constitutional rights. Through licensure,
spending, management of public resources, and other means,
governments regulate conversations and interactions that touch
upon, concern, or implicate constitutional rights-including
discussions concerning whether or not to exercise those rights
and the implications of their exercise. Even seemingly private
conversations, for example those between physicians and their
patients, can relate to broader public concerns. Patients may take
political action based on these conversations, or continue the
dialogue with family or friends. As Dean Robert Post has
observed, "there is no reason why public opinion might not be
formed one conversation at a time."13 1
Discourse about constitutional rights is part of
longstanding American social, political, and constitutional
traditions. In our democratic process, rights discourse is the
principal means of effecting constitutional change.1 32 The
130
131

See Central Radio Company, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2016).
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST

AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 46 (2012).

Some critics have derided what they view as Americans' obsession with
constitutional rights. They view certain characteristics of rights discourse as a cancer
on the body politic. In particular, critics consider "rights talk" to be a negative aspect
of public discourse that, among other things, distracts Americans from the collective
132

values of democratic life. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). However, these critics do not
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American political and constitutional systems fundamentally
depend upon access to information about constitutional rights
and the freedom to communicate facts, thoughts, and ideas
about those rights. Rights speech regulations affect these
democratic processes and implicate core First Amendment
values relating to self-government.
In sum, whenever government restricts or influences
private speech about constitutional rights, it threatens to interfere
with discourses that implicate the status, scope, or exercise of
those rights. These conversations are part of a constitutional
discourse that is critical to constitutional change.
B. Rights Dynamism
As the label suggests, "rights speech" regulations operate
at the intersection between two constitutional rights. Elsewhere
I have referred to the general process in which constitutional
rights intersect with one another as "Rights Dynamism."1 33 In
very general terms, the study of Rights Dynamism shows that,
from an inception point and thereafter in perpetuity,
constitutional rights frequently intersect with one another in
political debate, litigation, scholarly commentary, and other
settings.134 It also demonstrates that, over time, the interpretation
and enforcement of an individual right can be significantly
affected by its dynamic relationships with other rights.135
For example, as the Supreme Court indicated in Obergefell
v. Hodges,"' its recent marriage equality decision, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause,
while distinct provisions, have illuminated and influenced one
another's central meanings over time.137 The Court relied on the
combination of both provisions to recognize a right to marriage
deny the importance of allowing speakers, publishers, and others to communicate
information about the recognition, scope, and exercise of constitutional rights. Id. at
14. Their criticism goes primarily to the mode of conversation, rather than the
fundamental right to converse freely about rights. Id. at 15.
133 See generally Timothy Zick, Rights Dynamism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
2017).
134 See id. at 13-20 (describing the process and interpretive effects of Rights
Dynamism).
13 5
Id. at 20-22.
136 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
13 7
Id. at 2602-03.

20171

S C,4L M & 4 B OR TION SPEE CH

311

equality. Laurence Tribe has referred to the confluence of due
process and equal protection rights in Obergefell as a "double
helix" of constitutional protection.138 As Obergefell shows,
individual rights do not exist in isolation from one another, but
rather are relational constructs. As a jurisprudential matter,
marriage equality did not arise from thin air. It was the
culmination of decades of interactions-in courts, scholarly
works, and public discourses-between the due process and
equal protection guarantees.
As noted, Rights Dynamism produces interpretive effects.
Those effects are typically bi-directional.13 9 Thus, as the Due
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause have matured
together, the meanings of both provisions have been
transformed-sometimes as a result of mutual illumination and
at other times as a result of conflicts between these rights.140
Owing to its capacious language, and the ubiquity of
expressive activity, the Free Speech Clause has frequently
intersected with other constitutional rights. These rights include
the Equal Protection Clause, the Second Amendment, the Due
Process Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the constitutional
right to privacy. The First Amendment's Free Speech Clause has
both altered understandings of other rights, and has itself been
transformed as a result of its interactions with those rights. For
instance, while the freedom of speech has been critical to the
expansion of constitutional equality rights, the scope and
interpretation of free speech rights have also been significantly
transformed as a result of their frequent intersection with
equality rights.14 1 When rights intersect, the relationship tends to
leave indelible marks on both.
The Free Speech Clause and the abortion right have long
intersected with one another. Freedom of speech has been
critically important to the recognition, exercise, and
138 Laurence H. Tribe, EqualDignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REv. F. 16, 20
(2015).
139 See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 473, 474 (2002) (discussing the relationship
between due process and equal protection).

140 See id

141 See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciplein the First
Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 20, 26 (1975) (observing that there is a "principle of equal liberty of
expression . . . inherent in the [F]irst [A] mendment").
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interpretation of reproductive and abortion rights. As the cases
discussed in Part I show, free speech rights have sometimes
facilitated and sometimes conflicted with abortion rights. By the
same token, as Casey shows, changes to abortion rights have
raised new free speech concerns. In sum, the relationship has
influenced the exercise and interpretation of both free speech and
abortion rights.
Rights Dynamism is a complex and unpredictable
process. However, it is critical to understanding individual rights
and constitutional liberty that we attend to the dynamic
intersections between constitutional rights. In undertaking that
assessment, it is also important that we look in more than one
direction.
III. JUSTICE SCALA'S ABORTION SPEECH LEGACY

This final Part assesses Justice Scalia's abortion speech
legacy, from the perspective of Part II's observations regarding
rights speech, rights discourse, and Rights Dynamism. Justice
Scalia's opinions and votes in abortion speech cases produced a
mixed and somewhat complicated legacy. Although he
highlighted the importance of abortion speech and abortion
discourse to democratic deliberation, Justice Scalia's
conceptions of rights speech and rights discourse were narrow
and incomplete. Similarly, although Justice Scalia was an astute
observer of the dynamic intersection between freedom of speech
and abortion, his understanding of that dynamic was myopic. He
focused narrowly on a subset of the effects produced by the
interaction of freedom of speech and abortion rights-namely,
what he viewed as the suppression of anti-abortion speechwithout considering other important aspects of the relationship.
The explanation for these shortcomings could relate, in part, to
Justice Scalia's narrow and traditional conception of public
speech rights, and his views regarding the government's powers
to license and control certain speakers. However, it seems likely
that Justice Scalia's opinions and votes were also influenced by
his opposition to the abortion right. His strong opposition to Roe
was a complicating factor in Justice Scalia's abortion speech
legacy.
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A. Abortion Speech andAbortion Discourse

For defenders of strong public free speech protections,
there is much to admire in Justice Scalia's separate abortion
clinic opinions. Justice Scalia (1) argued for recognition and
protection of abortion speech as political speech, (2) insisted on
neutrality and objectivity in the enactment and review of speech
restrictions, (3) emphasized the need to preserve speakers' access
to traditional public fora, (4) emphatically rejected the notion
that audiences have a right or interest in avoiding unwanted
speech in those places, and (5) criticized broad injunctions as
dangerous prior restraints on speech. 142
Justice Scalia generally characterized abortion clinic
protesters and sidewalk counselors as participants in public
discourse about the morality and legality of abortion.1 43 He
emphasized that clinic protesters and others assembled at or near
abortion clinics were addressing a matter of utmost public
concern-the moral and legal validity of abortion-through
traditional methods of public dissent. 144 Accordingly, Justice
Scalia viewed injunctions and laws limiting abortion protests and
sidewalk counseling as efforts to stifle political speech.145
The notion that anti-abortion protesters and others were
engaged in legitimate public discourse about abortion may seem
a rather obvious point. But others, including some in the Court's
majority, appeared to treat protesters and counselors as potential
or actual threats to public order. In contrast, Justice Scalia
treated them as political speakers. He connected the speakers and
their message to core First Amendment values. For instance, he
characterized the ability to communicate about or concerning

See discussionsupra Part I.A.
See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 786-90 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (depicting abortion protest as a peaceful
and non-disruptive event).
144 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (" [T]he Court today continues and
expands its assault upon [abortion opponents'] individual right to persuade women
contemplating abortion that what they are doing is wrong.").
145 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court would have invalidated the
restriction "in an instant" if the speakers were anti-war protesters or others discussing
matters of public concern).
142
143
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the recognition, scope, or exercise of abortion rights as
"antecedent to . .. the survival of self-government."14 6
Treating anti-abortion protesters and sidewalk counselors
as discussants rather than miscreants changed how the Court
viewed these speakers. Although it did not change the results in
the first three clinic cases, by the time McCullen was decided,
Justice Scalia's perspective was clearly represented in the Court's
description of the speakers involved:
Some of the individuals who stand outside
Massachusetts abortion clinics are fairly described
as protestors, who express their moral or religious
opposition to abortion through signs and chants
or, in some cases, more aggressive methods such
as face-to-face confrontation. Petitioners take a
different tack. They attempt to engage women
approaching the clinics in what they call "sidewalk
counseling," which involves offering information
about alternatives to abortion and help pursuing
those options.14 7

Petitioners are not protestors. They seek not
merely to express their opposition to abortion, but
to inform women of various alternatives and to
provide help in pursuing them. Petitioners believe
that they can accomplish this objective only
through
personal,
caring,
consensual
1 48
conversations.
Thus, at least in the clinic context, Justice Scalia
recognized the speech at issue as abortion speech, and related it
to a broader public discourse about abortion. His efforts in this
regard appear to have paid some dividends. The majority in
McCullen treated the speech of sidewalk counselors as part of a
reasoned discourse about abortion.
In public discourse about matters of public concern,
including constitutional rights, Justice Scalia emphasized that
146
147
148

Id. at 763 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally Zick, Rights Speech, supra note 119.
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2527.
Id. at 2537.
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government must not discriminate for or against private
viewpoints.1 49 In his abortion clinic free speech opinions, Justice
Scalia repeatedly emphasized the importance of governmental
neutrality."'o He criticized colleagues for what he viewed as their
evident bias against anti-abortion speakers and speech."' Justice
Kennedy, who sometimes shared Justice Scalia's concerns
regarding restrictions on abortion speech, expressed the matter
this way in his separate dissent in Hill:
The liberty of a society is measured in part by what
its citizens are free to discuss among themselves.
Colorado's scheme of disfavored-speech zones on
public streets and sidewalks, and the Court's
opinion validating them, are antithetical to our
entire First Amendment tradition. To say that one
citizen can approach another to ask the time or the
weather forecast or the directions to Main Street
but not to initiate discussion on one of the most
basic moral and political issues in all of
contemporary discourse, a question touching
profound ideas in philosophy and theology, is an
astonishing view of the First Amendment.152
Justices Scalia and Kennedy were not alone in voicing
such concerns. A number of scholars, some of whom supported
abortion rights, agreed that the Court had erred in upholding the
Colorado law and had erred in adopting an abortion-protective

free speech position.153
149 See West Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
150 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accusing the Court of upholding an
injunction targeting anti-abortion speech); Hill, 530 U.S. at 742-48 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Colorado law restricting certain unwanted approaches
outside abortion clinics was content-based).
151 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's "relentlessly
proabortion jurisprudence").
152 Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153 See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, DisfavoredSpeech
About FavoredRights:
Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for an Objective Speech
DiscriminationTest, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 179, 199 (2001) (arguing that "the majority fell
head over heels for the seductive Colorado statute"); Laurence Tribe, Response,
ProfessorMichael W McConnell's Response, 28 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 747, 750 (2001) ("I
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In the clinic cases, Justice Scalia also emphasized the
need to preserve access to public places for expressive activities.
He made two points in that regard. The first was that the
protesters and counselors sought access to public streets,
sidewalks, and other areas where the First Amendment protected
free speech and other expressive rights.154 He insisted that courts
had a duty of "special care" to preserve speech rights in public
places.15
Justice Scalia's second point was that owing to their
proximity to abortion clinics, it was vitally important to the
speakers that they have access to public areas in the vicinityincluding places near the entrances to the clinics. Abortion
clinics are obviously places where women seek access to health
care and recourse to a recognized constitutional right to choose
whether to bear a child. However, in expressive terms, abortion
clinics are hotly contested places."' For some, the clinics are sites
of murder or infanticide. For some anti-abortion speakers,
abortion clinics are highly symbolic locations that magnify the
moral and legal concerns relating to abortion and abortion rights.
In Justice Scalia's view, the potent symbolism and
proximity of the clinics to the act of abortion were reasons to
protect and preserve abortion speech in public places, not restrict
it. In the clinic context, Justice Scalia insisted that preserving
access to public areas near abortion clinics was essential to
permitting anti-abortion protesters and sidewalk counselors to
attempt to persuade women not to exercise the abortion right.157
As he observed, "the most effective place, if not the only place,
where that persuasion can occur is outside the entrances to
abortion clinics."158
Justice Scalia also repeatedly dismissed the notion that
audiences in public places-including women seeking access to
don't think [Hill] was a difficult case. I think it was slam-dunk simple and slam-dunk
wrong.").
154 See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 786-90 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)
(emphasizing public forum point).
155 Schenck, 519 U.S. at 391 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
151 See ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 22, at ch. 4 (examining "contested"
nature of certain places).
157 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 763 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing sidewalks outside
abortion clinics as "a forum of last resort for those who oppose abortion").
158 Id.
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abortion services-had a "right to privacy" or a recognizable
interest in avoiding unwanted anti-abortion speech.159 In public
places, he argued, governments could not protect audiences from
speech because it produces offense or causes audience members
to second-guess their own beliefs or commitments.16 0 Indeed,
Justice Scalia argued that access was particularly important at
contested clinic spaces, where, again, speakers had their last and
best chance to persuade women not to obtain an abortion.
Justice Scalia's insistence on preserving access to public
places and vigorous, sometimes uncomfortable, abortion
discourse in those places also appears to have paid dividends. In
McCullen, the majority emphasized the "virtue" that on public
streets and sidewalks audiences cannot simply tune speakers out
if they are offended.' The Court also affirmed the importance
of maintaining content neutrality in these places.162 Finally,
although it did not specifically address the notion that
government had a valid interest in-or that audiences had a
cognizable right to-protection from unwanted speech in public,
the Court's holding and reasoning undermine such a claim.
Finally, a critical aspect of Justice Scalia's legacy
regarding abortion speech-and free speech more generallywas his reminder that injunctions targeting speakers or particular
speech pose special First Amendment dangers. Justice Scalia
overstated his claim that the Court had failed to follow settled
precedent with regard to the standard of review for such
injunctions. Contrary to his argument, that issue was not settled
when Madsen and Schenck were decided.1 63 However, Justice
Scalia reminded readers that the injunctions had been
specifically sought by those with a special interest in suppressing

159 See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(rejecting argument that women have a "right to be free of unwelcome speech on the
public streets while seeking entrance to or exit from abortion clinics"); Hill, 530 U.S.
at 750-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the argument that the state had a valid
interest in protecting women from unwanted speech).
160 See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2548-49 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The obvious purpose
of the Massachusetts Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act is to 'protect'
prospective clients of abortion clinics from having to hear abortion-opposing speech
on public streets and sidewalks.").
161 Id. at 2529.
162 Id.
163 See Farber, supra note 9, at 31 (noting that the Court had not
settled on a standard).
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anti-abortion expression.16 More generally, Justice Scalia
warned of the suppressive power of civil injunctions. He argued
that these aspects of speech injunctions warranted skeptical
(strict) judicial review.16
In these several respects, Justice Scalia's opinions in the
abortion clinic cases recognized and sought to preserve abortion
speech and abortion discourse. He sounded important alarms
concerning protecting political discourse, preserving access to
public places, maintaining content neutrality, and reviewing
speech injunctions with care.
However, as discussed in Part II, rights speech and rights
discourse take a variety of forms. Although Justice Scalia
devoted considerable energy to defending the speech of antiabortion protesters and sidewalk counselors at or near abortion
clinics, his conception of rights speech and rights discourse did
not extend to the full panoply of abortion communications in
other contexts and places. Indeed, in non-clinic cases, Justice
Scalia's insistence on protecting abortion speech and abortion
discourse either dissipated or disappeared altogether.
In Frisby, for example, Justice Scalia joined an opinion
that upheld a prohibition on the targeted protesting of an
abortion provider's home.166 As in the clinic cases, the targeted
protest ban in Frisby applied to speakers on public streets and
sidewalks.16 7 Further, the broad ordinance, which the Court
interpreted to ban only "targeted" activities, was enacted in
response to the activities of anti-abortion protesters.' Frisby thus
seemed like a good candidate for the sort of searching free speech
inquiry Justice Scalia would later undertake in the abortion clinic
cases. However, unlike some of his colleagues, Justice Scalia did
not write separately nor raise any concerns regarding the breadth
of the ordinance, its content-neutrality, or the prospect that the
town was seeking to silence abortion speech. Indeed, Justice
Scalia raised no free speech objection to the ordinance.
164 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165 See id.
166 See discussion supra notes 77-79 and accompanying
text.
167

Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988)

See id. at 476 (noting that "the picketing generated substantial controversy and
numerous complaints.").
168
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Nor, apparently, did Justice Scalia consider mandatory
physician abortion disclosures to be a threat to abortion speech
or abortion discourse. Recall that the Casey joint opinion
acknowledged that the First Amendment was "implicated" by
enforcement of such measures, but concluded that the state's
licensure power justified the mandated disclosures.169 Justice
Scalia did not indicate whether he shared this view. However, in
his Casey opinion, Justice Scalia concluded that the state was
required only to demonstrate a rationalbasis for these and other
abortion regulations.1 70 He also joined an opinion authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, which repudiated precedents
invalidating mandatory disclosures on due process grounds.17 1
There is no indication in either opinion that Justice Scalia saw
mandatory abortion disclosures as abortion speech regulations
or considered physician-patient consultations to be part of the
broader abortion discourse.
In fact, the Free Speech Clause is more prominently
"implicated" in this context than the Court or Justice Scalia
acknowledged. As one commentator has observed, Casey
articulated a framework by which the State could "structure the
woman's decisionmaking process" and "open up the expressive
channels of speech to the pregnant woman while she is engaged
in deliberation about her choice."172 In Casey, the Court was
effectively "granting leeway to the government to voice its own
opposition to abortion" in the context of physician-patient
conversations.1 7 3 Since Casey, many governments have enacted
measures that structure conversations between women and their
physicians regarding abortion.1 74 Some have imposed detailed
scripts that physicians are compelled to deliver to patients.17 5
Planned Parenthood of Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
170 See id. at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that he
would uphold the law "in its entirety" under rational basis standard).
171 See id. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
172 Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuringthe Woman's
DecisionmakingProcess,
417 3WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 787, 802 (1996).
1 d. at 791.
174 See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled
Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REv. 1277,
1334 (2014) (analyzing compelled abortion disclosure laws).
175 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b)-(c) (2011) (requiring that
abortion providers tell patients that abortion will "terminate the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being" and that "the pregnant woman has an existing
relationship with that unborn human being"); see also § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (requiring
169
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Others require that an ultrasound be displayed to the woman and
that doctors provide a detailed description of the image
(including information about limbs, vital organs, position in the
uterus, etc.).176
Several commentators have argued that these laws violate
the free speech rights of physicians and patients.177 Courts have
generally rejected this argument, in part on the ground that Casey
upheld Pennsylvania's
mandatory
abortion disclosure
1 78
provisions. The Supreme Court has said precious little about
the free speech rights of physicians and other professionals. Thus
far, it has failed to articulate a coherent or complete doctrine of
professional speech.
This has left the unfortunate (from a free speech
perspective) impression that governments are generally free to
structure, mandate, and influence conversations between
professionals and their clients or patients-even when those
conversations relate specifically to constitutional rights and other
matters of public concern. As discussed in Part II, professionalclient interactions often include rights speech-they touch upon
or concern the exercise of constitutional rights. More generally,
as one commentator has observed, "[p]rofessional speech serves
to educate the citizenry, is integral to the workings of self-

a doctor to explain "all known medical risks" of abortion, including the "increased
risk of suicide ideation and suicide").
"1 E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(a) (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9021.85(a)(2), (a)(4) (West 2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
171.012(a)(4)(C)-(D) (West 2011).
177 See Corbin, supra note 174, at 1334 (2014); Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech
and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment's Limit on Compelled Ideological
Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REv. 2347, 2389 (2013); Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A FirstAmendmentAnalysis of Compelled PhysicianSpeech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv.
939, 959-62 (2007); Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasoundand the
Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REv. 351, 399-400 (2008); Zick, Professional
Rights Speech, supra note 120.
17' For results in script cases, see Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds
(Rounds II), 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Planned Parenthood Minn.,
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds1), 530 F.3d 724, 738 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (vacating
preliminary injunction); Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. State
Dep't of Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d 892, 916, 918 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (upholding
requirement that physicians inform abortion patients that "human physical life begins
when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm."). For results in display cases,
see Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 (5th
Cir. 2012) (rejecting compelled speech claim brought by physicians); Rounds I, 530
F.3d at 735; Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating North
Carolina ultrasound narration law on compulsory speech grounds).
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government, and may even itself form part of a lesson in
democracy." 17 9 Physicians and other professionals are not
similarly situated to soapbox orators; they operate within highly
regulated institutions and are subject to standard of care and
other professional regulations. However, within these
institutions they sometimes engage in rights speech, and their
conversations connect to broader discourses about matters of
public concern-including constitutional rights. Like his
colleagues, Justice Scalia missed an opportunity in Casey to
carefully assess the First Amendment implications of mandated
abortion speech.
Finally, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in Rust,
which prohibited project-funded physicians from mentioning
abortion in consultations with their patients."'o The funding
condition in Rust directly suppressed abortion speech,
specifically counseling or advocacy regarding the exercise of the
abortion right. Justice Scalia nevertheless joined the majority
opinion, concluding either that the funding condition did not
amount to viewpoint-based discrimination or, if it did, that the
federal government was entitled to discriminate against proabortion speech in the context of a funding program. So long as
the government held the purse strings, Justice Scalia appeared to
accept that it was entitled to reject any abortion speech that was
inconsistent with its own principles or programs.
Although Rust did not acknowledge as much, funding
power significantly enhances government's ability to influence
abortion speech and abortion discourse. Rust allows
governments, as a condition of funding, to restrict or compel
communications about abortion. The spending power can also
be used in other ways to influence abortion discourse. For
instance, cutting off funding for Planned Parenthood will affect
not only the delivery of medical services but also lobbying and
other forms of advocacy. Laws and regulations may prohibit the
use of federal funds for the purpose of litigating abortion cases."'
179 Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status ofInstitutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771, 815 (1999).
..
oSee supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
...
See Legal Services Corporation Act (LSCA) § 1007(b)(8), 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)
(2012).
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Even state funding of specialty license plates can implicate
abortion discourse, as, for example, when the state authorizes or
refuses to authorize abortion-related messages.1 82 In each of these
contexts, abortion speech and abortion discourse are at least
indirectly restricted. Nevertheless, all indications are that Justice
Scalia's conceptions of abortion speech and abortion discourse
did not extend to these contexts.
Taken together, Frisby, Casey, and Rust show that Justice
Scalia's recognition of, and support for, abortion speech and
abortion discourse was rather limited and contextual. Of course,
there are many possible explanations for this contingent
recognition and support. The simplest one is that Justice Scalia's
objection to the Court's recognition of the abortion right led him
to dissent from any restrictions on anti-abortion speech and to
support restrictions on pro-abortion communications.
In Casey and Rust, Justice Scalia seemed not at all
concerned that pro-abortion advocacy, counseling, or
consultation was being suppressed or restricted. He might have
upheld
even
state-mandated
anti-abortion
ideological
statements-under the theory that the state was entitled to use
private speakers to dissuade women from exercising the abortion
right and to communicate its own position respecting abortion.
One also wonders how Justice Scalia would have dealt with local
ordinances and laws compelling so-called "crisis pregnancy
centers," which tend to operate as pro-life organizations, to tell
their patients that abortion and contraception services are not a
viable and legitimate option for pregnant women.183 Some courts
have invalidated these compulsory disclosures on the ground
that they compel abortion speech.184 Municipal laws do not

&

182 See Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that
state could ban subject of abortion entirely from license plates); Ariz. Life Coal., Inc.
v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 972-73 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that agency violated rights
of anti-abortion group by denying pro-life plate); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441
F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that "Choose Life" plates constituted
government speech); ACLU of N.C. v. Conti, 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 375 (E.D.N.C.
2012) (invalidating North Carolina law that allowed pro-life but not pro-choice plates).
183 See Corbin, supra note 174, at 1339-43 (discussing measures compelling pregnancy
centers to convey information about abortion services).
184 See Evergreen Ass'n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 249-50 (2nd Cir. 2014)
(invalidating pregnancy center services disclosure provision under strict and
intermediate scrutiny); Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor
City Council of Balt., 683 F.3d 539, 555 (4th Cir. 2012) (invalidating mandatory
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require similar disclosures and disclaimers regarding childbirth
and adoption services by abortion providers."' Would Justice
Scalia have recognized that abortion speech was present in these
cases and insisted on content neutrality?
While I do not think we can eliminate the Justice's own
anti-abortion bias as an explanation for many of his opinions or
votes, that explanation is not wholly satisfying. For one thing,
Frisby complicates the bias narrative. There are several possible
explanations for Justice Scalia's decision to join the majority in
Frisbyand uphold the restriction on targeted picketing outside the
abortion provider's home. The case predated the abortion clinic
cases, in which Justice Scalia purported to identify a pattern of
bias against anti-abortion speech. Further, the fact that the
ordinance was facially content-neutral may have satisfied Justice
Scalia that no effort to silence abortion protesters was afoot. Or
perhaps Justice Scalia credited the town's representations that
the ordinance would not be applied to a single picketer, and thus
would not broadly restrict anti-abortion speech on residential
streets and sidewalks."' Both of these possible explanations are
inconsistent with the skepticism Justice Scalia displayed in cases
like Madsen and Schenck.
However, it seems more likely that Justice Scalia's vote
in Frisby reflected his view that areas near residences, even if they
were traditional public fora, were simply not appropriatevenues
for abortion speech and abortion discourse. In the later clinic
cases, Justice Scalia drew a sharp distinction between privacy
rights in the home and in public places, distinguishing Frisby on
that ground.1 87 On this basis, some abortion speech was not
entitled to recognition and certain types of abortion discourse
were not worthy of protection.
pregnancy center disclosures under strict scrutiny); Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery
Cnty., 683 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012), affd en banc, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013).
But seeFargoWomen's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 182 (N.D. 1986),
(upholding mandatory disclosures under commercial speech standard).
15 See Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d
264, 294 (4th Cir. 2013) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (observing that pregnancy center
ordinance "compels groups that oppose abortion to utter a government-authored
message without requiring any comparable disclosure-or indeed any disclosure at
all-from abortion providers.").
186 See id. at 482 (interpreting ordinance to cover only "targeted" residential picketing).
17 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 753 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court "today
elevates the abortion clinic to the status of the home.").
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From this perspective, Justice Scalia's opinion in Casey
and his vote in Rust may be rooted in his views regarding the
scope of the state's power to license physicians and the
government's power to condition funding. However, the results
in those cases can also be attributed to Justice Scalia's views
regarding the appropriate scope of protection for abortion speech
and abortion discourse. On the public streets and sidewalks near
abortion clinics, Justice Scalia vigorously argued that abortion
speech and abortion discourse must be robust and wide-open and
that government must refrain from discriminating against
speakers or ideas. However, he did not view those restrictions as
applicable outside residences, in physicians' offices, or in
publicly funded programs. In these contexts, Justice Scalia failed
to acknowledge that abortion speech was occurring at all, much
less that broader concerns regarding abortion discourse were
implicated. He was content to permit authorities to regulate the
free flow of information concerning abortion and to influence the
provision of information by injecting itself into the conversation.
Moreover, as some of his comments in Casey suggested,
Justice Scalia did not view the Court itself as an appropriate
audience for abortion speech or a participant in abortion
discourse.1"' Just as he did not consider the home an appropriate
target for abortion speech, Justice Scalia viewed the Court's own
building, and the justices themselves, as out of bounds. Although
they did not have a constitutional right or interest in avoiding
unwanted political entreaties, Justice Scalia's apparent view was
that the Court's members were not appropriate audiences for
abortion speech-in part, of course, owing to his view that the
Court should not have recognized a right to abortion in the first
place.
In short, Justice Scalia appears to have had a particular
conception or vision of what abortion speech and abortion
discourse ought to look like. With regard to these matters, he was
a traditionalist-alabel it is not clear he would necessarily have

188 See Planned Parenthood of Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999-1000 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (expressing frustration at protests and letters concerning abortion that were
directed to the Court).
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rejected out of hand.189 From his perspective, abortion speech
and abortion discourse mattered and were worthy of protection
when they occurred in traditional venues and circumstanceswhen protesters confronted public audiences in public places
where they had a right to be present and to communicate on
matters of public concern. As discussed further below, this
narrow conception of abortion speech and abortion discourse
also affected Justice Scalia's perception of the dynamic
intersection between freedom of speech and abortion.
B. Abortion/Speech Dynamics
As explained in Part II, individual constitutional rights
are often involved in dynamic relationships with other rights.
Rights intersect and interact with one another-in litigation,
scholarship, lawmaking, public discourse, and other contexts.
When rights interact with one another in these contexts, their
interpretations and meanings can change over time. These
alterations can be reflected in constitutional doctrine, as well as
in broader perceptions about the relationship between the rights.
Consider the intersection between freedom of speech and
the right to abortion. Expressive and reproductive rights have a
long and complex relationship. Free speech and related
expressive rights have intersected with contraceptive and
abortion rights from the latter's inception. Indeed, modem
reproductive rights are rooted firmly in First Amendment free
speech rights.19 0
One of the frequent points of intersection between free
speech and abortion rights has occurred in connection with the
regulation of abortion speech. When protesters or sidewalk
counselors gather at abortion clinics to express their opposition
to or support for abortion, freedom of speech and abortion rights
are both implicated. As I have argued at length elsewhere, the
1..

See, e.g., RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA'S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND

(2006) (discussing Justice Scalia's jurisprudential approach to various
constitutional issues); David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12
CARDOZO L. REv. 1699 (1991) (examining the traditionalist aspects of Justice Scalia's
early jurisprudence).
190 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (locating a "rightto privacy"
in the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause and other rights provisions, which have
"penumbras, formed by emanations that help give them life and substance.").
TRADITION
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same is true when states compel physicians to convey
information to women contemplating an abortion or condition
funding on the recipient's agreement not to discuss abortion at
all.191 In all of these encounters, freedom of speech and abortion
rights are brought into direct contact with one another.
Thus, when they are reviewing restrictions on abortion
speech, courts are actually engaging with both free speech and
abortion rights at once. Free speech rights might affect-or might
be affected by-concerns regarding the recognition or
preservation of abortion rights. A court's free speech analysis
might be influenced by judicial bias in favor of or against
abortion rights, or by valid concerns relating to preserving access
to abortion services.
At the same time, understandings of abortion rights can
affect how free speech rights are interpreted in particular
contexts. For example, in the context of physician consultations
or funding projects, judicial decisions granting government
broad authority to weigh in on the abortion issue can affect
perceptions or interpretations of free speech rights in the abortion
context. Casey's alteration of the abortion right led the Court to
conclude that mandatory abortion disclosures "implicated" the
Free Speech Clause, but apparently not in a manner that
meaningfully constrained government from compelling
physicians to communicate official messages about abortion.1 92
One of the consistent themes of Justice Scalia's abortion
speech jurisprudence, which he expressed in all of his abortion
clinic opinions, was that the presence of the abortion right
distorted First Amendment precedents, rules, and values. In
these cases, Justice Scalia chided colleagues (including those on
record as opposing abortion rights) for altering or ignoring First
Amendment rules pertaining to injunctions, prior restraints,
content-neutrality, overbreadth, and time, place, and manner
speech regulations. In a recent comment, Daniel Farber
expresses skepticism regarding these bias claims and argues that
Justice Scalia overstated the extent to which the Court applied

191 See Zick, Rights Speech, supra note 119 (examining "professional rights speech"
regulations).
192 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
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exceptional First Amendment rules or doctrines in the clinic
cases. 193
Whether he was right or wrong about the Court's
application of precedents and doctrines, Justice Scalia
highlighted an important dynamic that often affects intersecting
constitutional rights. As he noted, the presence of the abortion
right may have influenced how the Court interpreted protesters'
and counselors' free speech rights. The abortion right was
implicated-some would maintain threatened-by the actions of
protesters and sidewalk counselors seeking to exercise what they
claimed were First Amendment rights to speak and gather near
clinic entrances. The abortion right would not be very
meaningful if speakers could exercise a heckler's veto by
effectively denying access to clinics or harassing women who
sought their services. In that sense, abortion rights likely did
influence at least some of the Court's interpretations of free
speech rights in the clinic cases.
In the clinic cases, the Court engaged in a balance that
was designed to allow protesters and other speakers to exercise
First Amendment rights, but also permit women to access
abortion services. Insofar as the Court established new standards
for reviewing injunctions, altered traditional overbreadth
analysis, applied content neutrality rules more flexibly, or
recognized a right to be let alone on the public sidewalks, those
precedents would, as Justice Scalia argued, produce new or
different understandings of First Amendment rights. These
precedents would presumably apply outside the abortion clinic
context. More generally, as Justice Scalia surmised, some
portion of the public might misconstrue or miss the significance
of these developments. As Justice Scalia put it, although they
were likely to be reported to the public as abortion rights
precedents, the abortion clinic cases would be printed in the
"lawbooks" as free speech precedents. 194
First Amendment scholars, myself included, have shared
Justice Scalia's basic concern that in some instances abortion
rights may have influenced the Court's interpretation and
See Farber, supra note 9, at 29-38.
See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 815 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193

194
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application of free speech rights in ways that could damage
public speech rights more generally.1 95 However, what is missing
from Justice Scalia's account of this dynamic is that it operates
in more than one direction. How judges and others interpret or
apply free speech rights in the clinic context can significantly
impact the recognition and exercise of abortion rights too.
Recall that in the clinic cases, Justice Scalia would have
invalidated all of the injunctive and statutory regulations on
abortion speech. This rigid interpretation of free speech rules and
precedents could have jeopardized basic access to abortion
services. Yet Justice Scalia was not even willing to concede that
preventing harassment of women seeking abortion services
constituted a valid reason for restricting abortion speech. His
opinions in the clinic and other cases left the distinct impression
that Justice Scalia either did not appreciate how the
interpretation of free speech rights might restrict or effectively
nullify abortion rights, or that he was not concerned with that
prospect.
Moreover, especially outside the clinic context, Justice
Scalia did not consider the negative impact the Court's abortion
jurisprudence could have on free speech doctrines and rights.
Casey's revision of the abortion right invited states to intervene in
physician-patient
consultations
regarding
abortion-an
invitation the states have enthusiastically accepted. By changing
the interpretation of the Due Process Clause to permit state
speech interventions short of actual coercion, the Court restricted
the free speech rights of physicians and the women with whom
they consult concerning abortion procedures. As noted, the
Court's interpretation of abortion rights broadly affects the area
of professional speech. On the "lawbooks," Casey can now be
treated by lower courts and officials as afree speech precedent that
limits or even nullifies professionals' free speech rights.
Similarly, Rust's validation of broad government power
to defund abortion services and impose even viewpoint-based
restrictions has narrowed private speech rights in the funding
context. Even more significantly, as subsequently interpreted by
the Court, Rust recognized a government speech exception to the
195

See Zick, Rights Speech, supra note 119; Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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First Amendment. Under that exception, governments are not
required to adhere to content neutrality rules when they are
acting as speaker or communicator.1 9 6 That doctrinal innovation,
which originated in concerns about abortion funding, drew no
objection or charge from Justice Scalia that an "abridged First
Amendment" was being developed or applied.197
In sum, Justice Scalia's perception of the free
speech/abortion dynamic, like his regard for abortion speech
and abortion discourse, was narrow and incomplete. He saw
peril to only some free speech rights, in one special abortionrelated context. However, the free speech/abortion dynamic is
complex and bi-directional, with effects from the intersection
extending in more than one direction and into different contexts.
Again, it is not possible to state with certainty whether
Justice Scalia's narrow focus was influenced by his own
preferences and biases regarding abortion rights, and if so to
what extent or degree. Justice Scalia certainly made no secret of
his disdain for Roe v. Wade. He may well have been aware of the
dynamic effects on abortion and free speech rights in all these
contexts, but was nonetheless undisturbed by most of them. For
whatever reason, although Justice Scalia highlighted the
intersection between freedom of speech and abortion, his
abortion speech opinions failed to take a holistic view of that
dynamic.
CONCLUSION

Among many other things, Justice Scalia will surely be
remembered as a strong supporter of freedom of speech. Justice
Scalia's opinions in the abortion clinic cases exemplify this
important part of his legacy. He well understood that in a
democracy, constitutional change depends on a process of open
and rigorous debate concerning matters of public concernparticularly the recognition, scope, and exercise of constitutional
rights. In the clinic cases, Justice Scalia emphasized the political
nature of anti-abortion speech. He stressed the need to preserve
196 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
(characterizing Rust as involving a program of government speech).
197 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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access to public places for the purpose of engaging in rights
speech and rights discourse. He warned against state
intermeddling, whether by judicial injunction or statute, in
public discourse about abortion rights. And he strongly rejected
the premise that public audiences were constitutionally or
otherwise entitled to avoid abortion speech and other
communications that they found offensive or unwelcome.
Finally, Justice Scalia consistently challenged his colleagues to
ensure that their views regarding abortion rights were not
distorting the interpretation of free speech rights.
Reading Justice Scalia's abortion clinic opinions in
isolation, one might get the impression that he was a consistent
supporter of abortion speech, recognized the importance of
abortion discourse in all contexts, and was acutely aware of the
influence rights can have on one another when they come into
contact. Upon closer examination, however, Justice Scalia's
recognition of rights speech, conception of rights discourse, and
understanding of rights dynamics were all incomplete.
Justice Scalia did not acknowledge or recognize all forms
of abortion speech. He was not always and in every context a
supporter of robust and wide-open abortion discourse. Rather,
Justice Scalia's conception of abortion speech and abortion
discourse was narrowly traditional. It extended only to public
protests and other expressive activities, in certain public places,
targeted to public audiences. Further, Justice Scalia's
understanding of or concern with the dynamic intersection
between freedom of speech and abortion rights was onedirectional and myopic. Either Justice Scalia did not appreciate
that freedom of speech and abortion intersected in dynamic and
multi-directional ways, or he understood perfectly well that this
was the case yet viewed only one aspect of that intersection as
problematic.

